By Isiaka Mustapha, CEO/Editor-in-Chief, People’s Security Monitor

The recent establishment of the Nigeria Forest Security Service (NFSS) by the Federal Government has sparked widespread criticism from security experts, civil society organizations, and analysts familiar with the country’s security architecture. While the initiative may appear commendable on the surface aimed at enhancing forest protection and addressing issues such as banditry, kidnapping, illegal mining, and deforestation its implementation seems both unnecessary and counterproductive. Rather than improving national security, this move further fragments Nigeria’s already overstretched security apparatus and overlooks existing agencies better equipped to handle these challenges, if given the necessary support.

The Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC), established by an Act of the National Assembly in 2003 and amended in 2007, has a statutory mandate that includes the protection of critical national assets, including forests and other natural resources. As part of this mandate, the Corps created the Agro-Rangers unit to tackle insecurity in farming and rural communities. This specialized unit has been deployed across all 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory.

By 2024, more than 7,000 Agro-Rangers were actively operating in agricultural zones, many of which are located deep within forests frequently targeted by bandits and armed criminals. These officers are trained not only in combat and reconnaissance but also in community engagement and conflict resolution skills essential for navigating the complex realities of rural security in Nigeria.

Working alongside the NSCDC is the Vigilante Group of Nigeria (VGN), a grassroots security network with an estimated 250,000 members nationwide. Operating in areas where conventional security agencies are often absent, the VGN has proven highly effective in intelligence gathering, early warning, and rapid response to incidents in forests and rural communities. Their deep familiarity with the terrain and strong ties to local populations make them invaluable in the fight against insecurity in forest regions. Yet, despite their proven track record, the VGN remains without formal federal recognition or structured funding, operating largely on community goodwill and limited state-level support.

The decision to establish a new agency the NFSS, essentially to carry out duties already within the purview of the NSCDC and VGN, raises serious concerns about duplication of functions, wasteful expenditure, and the unnecessary expansion of government bureaucracy. In a country already grappling with inter-agency rivalry, poor coordination, and overlapping mandates, the NFSS risks compounding an already convoluted security landscape. Nigeria currently operates more than 20 federal security-related agencies, including the Nigeria Police Force, Nigerian Army, Department of State Services (DSS), NSCDC, Nigeria Immigration Service, and the NDLEA, among others. Introducing yet another agency without clearly defined responsibilities is unlikely to enhance security outcomes.

From a financial perspective, the creation of the NFSS is especially troubling, given the country’s prevailing economic challenges. With a substantial portion of government revenue already committed to servicing existing debts, the fiscal capacity to support a new security agency is highly constrained. Despite receiving considerable allocations in recent years, the NSCDC continues to struggle with inadequate operational tools from vehicles and surveillance systems to weaponry and personnel welfare. Rather than introducing a new agency, it would be more prudent and cost-effective to strengthen the Agro-Rangers by increasing funding, deploying modern surveillance technologies like drones, and improving logistical support. This approach would not only be more efficient but also more effective in protecting forested and rural areas.

Additionally, the VGN, Nigeria’s largest voluntary security organization, has been advocating for formal federal recognition for over a decade. Several bills have been introduced in the National Assembly to legally establish the VGN, yet none have been passed. Instead of prioritizing this long-overdue legislation and reinforcing existing, functional structures, the government has chosen to launch an entirely new project, one that risks becoming politicized and inefficient from the outset. The VGN’s presence in forested areas of states such as Zamfara, Kaduna, Niger, Taraba, and Cross River has already led to tangible results, including intercepting bandits, curbing cattle rustling, and rescuing kidnap victims. Formal integration of the VGN into the national security architecture would yield immediate benefits at a minimal cost.

The rationale for creating the NFSS collapses when examined against the real issues plaguing forest security. Nigeria’s forests are not lawless zones due to the absence of legislation; they remain ungoverned because of weak state presence, inadequate logistics, poor intelligence infrastructure, and insufficient manpower. What Nigeria urgently needs is not more uniformed agencies, but the effective deployment of existing personnel properly equipped and supported with political will.

Operational evidence suggests that a well-trained Agro-Rangers squad, equipped with GPS tracking, drone support, and reliable communication systems, can effectively monitor up to 50 square kilometers of forest terrain. In contrast, a newly formed NFSS, lacking a solid structure, experienced personnel, and community trust would require years to attain similar levels of reach and effectiveness. This would delay Nigeria’s response to rural insecurity, erode public confidence, and further strain scarce financial resources.

Security experts have consistently warned against the unchecked proliferation of security outfits without a coherent national coordination strategy. Nigeria’s military, police, DSS, and NSCDC already face challenges in harmonizing intelligence and operational activities. Introducing the NFSS into this environment without a clearly defined mandate and legal framework could exacerbate friction, reduce efficiency, and lead to more operational overlap. Furthermore, there are valid concerns about whether the NFSS was created out of genuine national interest or merely as a political tool potentially designed to create new positions for loyalists or expand patronage networks.

The NFSS appears to be yet another example of a “create-to-appoint” approach, a recurring policy misstep that has undermined the effectiveness of Nigeria’s security reforms over the years. Similar instances of institutional redundancy such as the proliferation of anti-corruption bodies or overlapping environmental agencies have contributed little to national progress. More often than not, such arrangements result in inter-agency conflicts, redundant funding, and turf wars, rather than collaborative, results-driven efforts.

Establishing the Nigeria Forest Security Service at this critical juncture is not only redundant but also reflects a fundamental misjudgment of national priorities. With the country facing economic hardships, fragile internal security, and an overstretched security workforce, efforts should focus on strengthening and consolidating existing structures not creating new ones. The NSCDC, through its Agro-Rangers, and the VGN, with its extensive grassroots reach and public credibility, already possess the mandate and operational insights required to secure forested zones. What they lack is not capability, but the crucial pillars of political commitment, legal recognition, and adequate funding.

Instead of investing in an entirely new entity like the NFSS, the federal government would achieve far greater efficiency and impact by reinforcing existing security frameworks. Prioritizing the passage of the VGN Establishment Act, upgrading the capacity of the NSCDC Agro-Rangers, and fostering improved coordination among all security agencies would yield quicker, more sustainable, and cost-effective outcomes. Anything short of this would signify a grave policy miscalculation one Nigeria can ill afford.