By Isiaka Mustapha, CEO/Editor-in-Chief, People’s Security Monitor

Peter Obi’s ongoing engagements across various Nigerian states largely perceived as subtle or premature campaigning carry significant security risks that go far beyond ordinary political maneuvering. In a nation where political tension often teeters on the edge of violence, such high-profile activities conducted outside the timeframe set by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) pose both urgent and far-reaching threats to public safety and national stability.

Peter Obi’s rising public presence evident in carefully organized town hall meetings, symbolic visits, and media-driven engagements bears the hallmarks of a full-fledged political campaign, despite the fact that the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) has yet to declare the official campaign season open. Though these activities may not directly violate electoral laws, their intent and execution marked by frequency, calculated messaging, and strategic optics are clearly geared toward galvanizing public support and projecting political ambition.

Such indirect campaigning, carried out without formal coordination with relevant security or political authorities, presents significant security risks. Primarily, it hampers the preparedness of state governments and security agencies in managing large public events. Under Nigeria’s security structure, governors serve as the chief security officers of their respective states, tasked with preventing disturbances and ensuring public order. When a prominent political figure like Obi enters a state without prior notification or collaboration with the local security apparatus, it weakens the ability to foresee and contain potential threats. This is particularly troubling in states already contending with security challenges, where the sudden convergence of politically charged crowds could spark panic, provoke confrontations, or even incite violence.

The risk is not abstract. Nigeria’s political environment is deeply polarized, and political figures, especially those with a populist following like Peter Obi, often evoke strong emotional reactions. His core supporters, known as the “Obidients,” are largely youth-driven and have demonstrated both online and offline assertiveness that, if unregulated, could spark clashes with opposing political groups. In the absence of campaign rules and security protocols, these crowds are unchecked, unpredictable, and susceptible to provocation. In politically sensitive areas, such gatherings can quickly spiral into street violence, especially if met with resistance by local actors or hostile elements.

Furthermore, premature political engagements can be exploited by criminal elements or political thugs who view such events as opportunities to cause disruption, settle scores, or assert dominance. Without adequate policing or formal authorization, these campaign-like visits lack the necessary security architecture to prevent or respond to such threats. The situation becomes even more volatile in states already dealing with insurgency, banditry, or ethnic tensions. A single incident of violence during one of these visits could easily escalate, undermining months of peacebuilding and security efforts in those states.

Another critical issue is the strain placed on intergovernmental relations. When a prominent politician like Obi visits a state without informing or respecting the role of the sitting governor, it creates friction between political actors and security stakeholders. In retaliation, state governments may deploy heavy-handed tactics such as blocking venues, dispersing crowds, or denying logistical support. Such confrontations increase the risk of clashes between state security agents and supporters of the visiting politician scenarios that often lead to injuries, property damage, or in extreme cases, loss of life.

These premature movements also send dangerous signals to other political aspirants. If left unchecked, more candidates may begin covert campaigns of their own, leading to a nationwide wave of unsanctioned political rallies and mobilizations. This would overstretch an already burdened security apparatus, create confusion across the states, and leave INEC struggling to maintain control of the electoral process. In such a chaotic political environment, violence becomes harder to predict and prevent.

Even more troubling is the potential for extremist groups or regional agitators to capitalize on such events. In areas where separatist sentiment or religious militancy exists, a politically charged visit from a national figure especially one associated with a different region or religious background can provoke local backlash. Without official coordination, such situations are tinderboxes waiting for a spark.

If he truly Obi seeks to lead, responsibility must precede ambition. National peace and internal stability must not be sacrificed on the altar of early mobilization.

Security agencies, INEC, and civil society must begin to pay close attention to these developments. Electoral timelines exist not just for procedural order, but for national safety. Political movements outside these timelines, especially by high-profile figures, must be treated as potential security risks. Nigeria cannot afford to walk into the next election cycle under the cloud of unregulated, emotionally charged, and potentially explosive political activity. The price of silence or inaction may be too high.